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Poverty Rankings of Opportunity Profiles

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Abstract - We address the problem of ranking distributions of opportunity sets in terms of poverty. In order to accomplish this task, we identify a suitable notion of 'multidimensional poverty line', extend the most widely used income poverty criteria to opportunity profiles, and provide characterizations of a few poverty rankings that rely on such criteria.

JEL classification: D31; D63; I31.

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1. INTRODUCTION¹

The present work is devoted to the problem of ranking distributions of individual opportunity sets in terms of poverty. The relevance of the problem arises from two basic considerations.

First, poverty reduction plays a prominent role in political debates in many countries, hence methods and techniques to make poverty comparisons are necessary tools in order to design and to evaluate policies aimed at decreasing poverty.

Since the publication of Sen's (1976) pioneering paper on poverty measurement, in the last quarter century a great deal has been written on this subject, several measures of poverty, including the one suggested by Sen (1976), are now available in the literature. However, most of the existing literature on poverty measurement regards income or consumption expenditures as the only relevant explanatory dimension of poverty. This approach now appears as inadequate because poverty is essentially a multidimensional phenomenon and the exclusive reliance on just one indicator can hide crucial aspects of economic deprivation. Indeed, if we consider for example two societies with the same distribution of monetary earnings, we can hardly think of them as equivalent in terms of poverty if in one of these fractions of the population are denied a number of basic rights and liberties such as the right to vote, freedom of speech, freedom of movement and so on.

Although the inadequacy of a unidimensional approach to evaluating social inequities is well recognized, it is nevertheless a common practice of economists to do so. One of the basic reasons for this is linked to the difficulties in data collection and data analysis. However, in addition to data limitation and empirical constraints, a multidimensional evaluation of poverty is by no means straightforward from a theoretical point of view. Little is known about how to compare different distributions of, say, rights, freedoms, primary goods, or functionings. Nonetheless, many scholars like Rawls (1971), Sen (1980, 1997), Roemer (1996) have defended, in their influential works, the necessity to move from an income-based evaluation of social inequities towards a more comprehensive domain.

The focus of the present work is, in fact, this specific measurement problem. In particular, we consider the problem of ranking distributions of opportunities on the basis of poverty. An individual's opportunities are described by a set rather than by a scalar, as it is the case with income or consumption. As a consequence, the problem becomes that of ranking different distributions of opportunity sets.

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To keep the approach as general as possible, the notion of “opportunity” is treated in an abstract way: we define an opportunity set as any finite set in some arbitrary space². Opportunities may be thought of as non welfare characteristics of agents such as basic liberties, political rights, and individual freedoms; or as access to certain welfare enhancing traits; a further interpretation is in terms of functionings à la Sen (such as being educated, being well-nourished, avoiding premature mortality): in this case the opportunity set corresponds to the capability set of an individual.

The question of how to rank different opportunity distributions has been first addressed by Kranich (1996), who however focused only on inequality rankings. There is now an extensive literature concerned with the measurement of inequality of opportunity: see, for example, Arlegi and Nieto (1999), Bossert, Fleurbaey, and Van de gaer (1999), Herrero (1997), Herrero, Iturbe-Ormaetxe, and Nieto (1998), Kranich (1996, 1997), Ok (1997), Ok and Kranich (1998), and Savaglio and Vannucci (2007). A survey of this literature may be found in Barberà et al. (2004).

On the other hand, the question of how to rank different distributions of opportunities in terms of the poverty they exhibit has never been addressed before. The present paper fills this gap. We address the problem of ranking profiles of opportunity sets on the basis of poverty.

A natural approach towards devising a poverty ranking for opportunity distributions is to try to extend the basic income poverty measures into our richer setting. We, therefore, design our analysis by studying alternative ways of extending the familiar notion of “poverty line” and the most well known poverty measures in the context of opportunity distributions. In order to identify the different value systems involved in the use of different poverty criteria we use the axiomatic methodology: we propose a number of properties that a poverty relation on the possible distributions (profiles) of finite opportunity sets should satisfy and we study their logical implications. We introduce a threshold or minimum standard for opportunity sets and characterize two fundamental orderings: the Head-Count and the Opportunity-Gap poverty rankings. Such rankings are the natural counterparts of the most widely used income poverty measures, namely the *head count ratio* and the *income poverty gap*. Indeed, the head-count ranking is produced by counting the number of population units whose endowments fail to meet the minimum standard. On the other hand, the opportunity gap ranking is produced by counting the number of extra-opportunities (or functionings) each population unit should be endowed with in order to achieve the minimum standard, and *summing* them.³

In addition, we axiomatically characterize two lexicographic orderings based on the HC and OG rankings and a third one based on a linear combination of the head-count and gap criteria.

²This fundamental modeling choice makes our study different (and possibly more general) than the existing literature on multidimensional poverty measurement: see, among others, Chakravarty et al. (1998) and Bourguignon and Chakravarty (1999, 2002), Tsui (2002).

³This is admittedly a quite crude ‘metric’ of opportunity gap but, if combined with suitable definitions of the opportunity space and the poverty threshold, it may make much sense as a first approximation to a sound assessment of the aggregate ‘intensity of poverty’.

The paper is organized as follow. The next section introduces the analytical setting and defines formally the basic problem studied in this paper. Section 3 introduces and discuss a first set of axioms and contains the main results of the paper: the characterization of the Head-Count and the Opportunity-Gap poverty rankings. Section 4 provide and discuss an additional set of axioms aimed at characterizing composite rankings based on the HC and OG. Section 5 concludes with a brief discussion of the results and of directions for future research, while an appendix collects all proofs.

2. THE FRAMEWORK

We start by identifying a universal non-empty set of opportunities, denoted by X . We assume that each element in X is desirable in some universal sense. Moreover, following the existing literature, we assume that opportunities are nonrival, so that a given opportunity is potentially available to everyone simultaneously, and that opportunities are excludable, so that providing an opportunity to some individuals does not necessarily imply that everyone has this opportunity.

Let $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$ denote the finite set of relevant population units and $\mathcal{P}[X]$ the set of all *finite* subsets of X . Elements of $\mathcal{P}[X]$ are referred to as *opportunity sets*, and mappings $\mathbf{Y} = (Y_1, \dots, Y_n) \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$ as profiles of opportunity sets, or simply *opportunity profiles*.

Hence, each individual in a society is endowed with an *opportunity set* and a society is represented by an *opportunity profiles*. We are interested in ranking such opportunity profiles in terms of poverty.⁴

Following Sen's approach, the evaluation of poverty can be divided into two steps: (i) the identification step, in which the poor are identified in a given society; (ii) the aggregation step, in which the characteristics of the poor have to be aggregated in order to obtain an assessment of the aggregate poverty in a society.

As for the identification step, in the unidimensional context an income poverty line is chosen that divides the population into two sets: the poor and the non-poor. The identification of that income level below which people are described as poor can follow an absolute or a relative approach. While with an absolute approach the poverty line is defined in an exogenous way and is the same across distributions, with a relative approach the poverty line in a distribution is a function of the distribution itself (e.g. the poverty line can be fixed at half the median income level in that society).

In our framework, a *poverty threshold* (or poverty line) is a set $T \in \mathcal{P}[X]$, which identifies a set of *essential alternatives*: an individual is declared as poor or, equivalently, he is declared to be

⁴Notice that our general model can be related to behaviorally oriented notions of opportunity set by the following interpretation. Let X be a possibly multidimensional space of relevant, observable functionings, N^* a population, $\mathbf{x} \in X^{N^*}$ the profile of achieved functionings within the population under consideration, and $\boldsymbol{\pi} = \{\pi_1, \dots, \pi_n\} \in \Pi(N)$ a partition of the population into a finite set $\{1, \dots, n\}$ of types according to a fixed set of verifiable criteria, and $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$ the population of types. Then, the opportunity set of type $i \in N$ at $(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\pi})$ is $X_i = \{x \in X : \text{there exists } j \in \pi_i \text{ such that } x_i = x\}$

below the poverty threshold, if her opportunity set does not contain all the essential alternatives, i.e., all the alternatives contained in T . It is worth emphasizing here that the identification of essential alternatives and the distinction between essential and non essential alternatives plays a crucial role in our axiomatic construction. The set T is not dependent on the specific profile: i.e., in the identification step we adopt an absolute approach.

One possible interpretation of such essential alternatives is linked to the basic needs approach: hence having access to all essential alternatives in the interpretation means being able to satisfy all basic needs. A related interpretation suggests that the essential alternatives could represent certain basic functionings (see Sen (1985)) such as, for example, life expectancy, literacy, and so on, or a set of primary goods (see Rawls (1971)).

As for the aggregation step, the problem is that of “putting together” the information on the deprivation suffered by the poor in a society, to arrive to a unique evaluation of the aggregate poverty. In the present setting, since people differ for many personal attributes/opportunities, we are working in a multidimensional domain. Then, our first step involves the definition of a metric in the space of opportunity sets: in other words, we need first to define a criterion to compare individuals endowed with different opportunity sets. Thus, when is one person poorer (richer) than another person in terms of opportunities? There is an extensive literature devoted to the problem of ranking opportunity sets (see on this the excellent survey by Barberà *et alii* (2001)). In order to answer to such a question, we propose a criterion such that all the sets above the poverty threshold are each other indifferent; as for the sets below the poverty thresholds, they are ranked by set inclusion. Therefore, we consider a unique indifference class within the universe of the non-poor and we propose the very mild condition of set inclusion as the reference ranking rule within the poor.

Formally, our starting point is a preorder \succsim_T^* on $\mathcal{P}[X]$ induced by the poverty threshold T and defined as follows: for any $Y, Z \in \mathcal{P}[X]$,

$$Y \succsim_T^* Z \text{ if and only if } [Y \supseteq Z \text{ or } Y \supseteq T].$$

The notation $\mathbf{Y}_{|T}$ will be employed in the rest of this paper to denote opportunity profile $(Y_i \cap T)_{i \in N}$. A *poverty ranking* of opportunity profiles under threshold T is a preorder \succsim_T on $\mathcal{P}[X]^N$ such that for any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T \mathbf{Z}$ whenever $Z_i \succsim_T^* Y_i$ for each $i \in N$.

In the present work, we generalize two of the most widely used income poverty measures, namely the *head count ratio* and the *income poverty gap* in a context of opportunity profiles:

Definition 1. The head-count (HC) poverty ranking under threshold T is the preorder \succsim_T^h on $\mathcal{P}[X]^N$ defined as follows: for any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{Y} &\succsim_T^h \mathbf{Z} \text{ if and only if } h_T(\mathbf{Y}) \geq h_T(\mathbf{Z}), \text{ where for each } \mathbf{W} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N, \\ h_T(\mathbf{W}) &= \#H_T(\mathbf{W}) \text{ and } H_T(\mathbf{W}) = \{i \in N : W_i \not\supseteq T\}. \end{aligned}$$

The head-count poverty ordering ranks two distributions on the basis of the number of individuals that are below the poverty threshold T , hence, it captures the incidence of poverty. Although such a measure gives useful information on the poverty in a distribution, the head-count does not take into account the depth or the severity of the deprivation suffered by the poor. In order to capture this aspect of the aggregate poverty, we also propose the *opportunity-gap (OG) poverty ranking* which measures the aggregate intensity of poverty.

Definition 2. The opportunity-gap (OG) poverty ranking under threshold T is the preorder \succsim_T^g on $\mathcal{P}[X]^N$ defined as follows: for any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{Y} &\succsim_T^g \mathbf{Z} \text{ if and only if } g_T(\mathbf{Y}) \geq g_T(\mathbf{Z}), \text{ where} \\ \text{for each } \mathbf{W} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N, &g_T(\mathbf{W}) = \sum_{i \in H_T(\mathbf{W})} \#\{x : x \in T \setminus W_i\}. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, for each poor individual, the intensity of poverty, the “individual gap”, is measured by the number of essential alternatives she does not have access to. The opportunity-gap poverty ranking aggregates this information by summing the individual gaps; hence, it tells us how poor are the poor. In the following, we propose some desirable properties that a poverty ranking should satisfy.

3. THE BASIC CHARACTERIZATIONS

The axiomatic structure we propose will lead us to the characterization of the foregoing two poverty criteria defined above.

3.1. The axioms. We introduce now the following basic properties for a poverty ranking \succsim_T of $\mathcal{P}[X]^N$:

Axiom 1 (*Anonymity (AN)*). For any permutation π of N , and any $\mathbf{Y} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$: $\mathbf{Y} \sim_T \pi \mathbf{Y}$ (where $\pi \mathbf{Y} = (Y_{\pi(1)}, \dots, Y_{\pi(n)})$).

Axiom 2 (*Irrelevance of Inessential Opportunities (IIO)*). For any $\mathbf{Y} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, $i \in N$, and $x \in Y_i \setminus T$: $\mathbf{Y} \sim_T (\mathbf{Y}_{-i}, Y_i \setminus \{x\})$.

Axiom 3 (*Irrelevance of Poor’s Opportunity Deletions (IPOD)*). For any $\mathbf{Y} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, $i \in H_T(\mathbf{Y})$, and $x \in Y_i$: $\mathbf{Y} \sim_T (\mathbf{Y}_{-i}, Y_i \setminus \{x\})$.

Axiom 4 (*Dominance at Essential Profiles (DEP)*). For any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$ such that both $\{Y_1, \dots, Y_n\} \subseteq \{T, \emptyset\}$ and $\{Z_1, \dots, Z_n\} \subseteq \{T, \emptyset\}$,

$$\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z} \text{ if and only if } \#\{i \in N : Y_i = \emptyset\} > \#\{i \in N : Z_i = \emptyset\}.$$

The first three axioms are *invariance properties*, in the sense that they require our poverty rankings to ignore certain aspects of the opportunity distributions and to focus on others. The first, *Anonymity*, is an axiom that requires a symmetric treatment of individuals, thereby preventing from paying attention to the identities of individuals. *Irrelevance of Inessential Opportunities* says that if the opportunity set of an individual i is reduced by the subtraction of an alternative which is not essential, then the new profile of opportunity sets exhibits the same degree of poverty as the original profile. This axiom is reminiscent of the *Focus axiom*, used in the income poverty paradigm, which requires invariance with respect to reduction in the incomes of the non-poor; however, instead of distinguishing between the poor and the non-poor, in the current scenario the basic distinction is between essential and non essential alternatives. *Irrelevance of Poor's Opportunity Deletions* says that if the opportunity set of a poor individual i is reduced by the subtraction of an alternative, then the new profile of opportunity sets exhibits the same degree of poverty as the original profile.

While the previous invariance properties are useful in identifying the information that our poverty rankings should use, the last axiom is a *dominance property*, which identifies classes of transformation that have a certain effect on the poverty rankings, thereby restricting the set of poverty criteria. *Dominance at Essential Profiles* indeed considers a particular case in which two ‘degenerate’ profiles are composed of either empty sets or sets coinciding with the poverty threshold T . In this special case, one profiles exhibit more poverty than the other if the number of people endowed with the null set in the former is higher than the number of individuals endowed with an empty opportunity set in the latter.

These axioms are necessary and sufficient conditions to state our characterization of the *HD*-poverty ranking \succ_T^h :

Proposition 1. Let \succ_T be a poverty ranking of $\mathcal{P}[X]^N$ under threshold $T \subseteq X$. Then \succ_T is the *HC* ranking \succ_T^h if and only if \succ_T satisfies AN, IIO, IPOD and DEP. Moreover, such a characterization is tight.

In order to also characterize the opportunity-gap poverty ranking \succ_T^g , we now introduce two further axioms:

Axiom 5 (*Strict Monotonicity with respect to Essential Deletions (SMED)*). For any $\mathbf{Y} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, $i \in N$, and $x \in Y_i \cap T$: $(\mathbf{Y}_{-i}, Y_i \setminus \{x\}) \succ_T \mathbf{Y}$.

Axiom 6 (*Independence of Balanced Essential Deletions (IBED)*). For any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, $i \in N$, $y \in Y_i \cap T$ and $z \in Z_i \cap T$: $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $(\mathbf{Y}_{-i}, Y_i \setminus \{y\}) \succ_T (\mathbf{Z}_{-i}, Z_i \setminus \{z\})$.

Strict Monotonicity with respect to Essential Deletions is another dominance property which says that if the opportunity set of an individual i is reduced by the subtraction of an essential alternative, then the new profile of opportunity sets exhibits a higher degree of poverty than the original profile. This axiom is a direct translation in our context of the Monotonicity axiom used in the income inequality paradigm (see Foster (2006)); again the difference relies on the fact that in the current scenario the crucial distinction is between essential and non essential alternatives rather than between poor and non-poor individuals.

Finally, we propose a standard independence axiom, *Independence of Balanced Essential Deletion*, which pertains to the deletion of an essential alternative from the set of an individual i in two opportunity profiles \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} . Such balanced deletions preserves the ranking of the two opportunity profiles.

The first two and the last two axioms of this section are necessary and sufficient to characterize our poverty-gap criterion:

Proposition 2. Let \succ_T be a poverty ranking of $\mathcal{P}[X]^N$ under threshold $T \subseteq X$. Then \succ_T is the OG ranking \succ_T^g if and only if \succ_T satisfies AN, IIO, SMED and IBED. Moreover, such a characterization is tight.

4. COMPOSITE RANKINGS

In this section, we propose and axiomatically characterize two lexicographic orderings based on the HC and OG rankings and third one based on a linear combination of the head-count and gap criteria.

The first composite criterion, the *(HG)- lexicographic poverty ranking*, combines in a lexicographic order the HG and the OG rankings, with priority given to the HC criterion.

Definition 3. A *(HG)- lexicographic poverty ranking of opportunity profiles under threshold T* is a binary relational system $(\mathcal{P}[X]^N, \succ_T^{hg})$ where \succ_T^{hg} is a preorder defined as follow: for any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$,

$$\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^{hg} \mathbf{Z} \text{ if and only if either } \mathbf{Y} \succ_T^h \mathbf{Z} \text{ or } (\mathbf{Y} \sim_T^h \mathbf{Z} \text{ and } g_T(\mathbf{Y}) \geq g_T(\mathbf{Z})).$$

The *(GH)- lexicographic poverty ranking* also combines in a lexicographic order the HG and the OG rankings, but with priority given to the OG criterion.

Definition 4. A *(GH)- lexicographic poverty ranking of opportunity profiles under threshold T* is a binary relational system $(\mathcal{P}[X]^N, \succ_T^{gh})$ where \succ_T^{gh} is a preorder defined as follow: for any

$\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$,

$\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^{gh} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if either $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^g \mathbf{Z}$ or $(\mathbf{Y} \sim_T^g \mathbf{Z} \text{ and } h_T(\mathbf{Y}) \geq h_T(\mathbf{Z}))$.

Finally, the (HG) - weighted poverty ranking linearly combines the HG and the OG criteria.

Definition 5. A (HG) -weighted poverty ranking of opportunity profiles under threshold T is a binary relational system $(\mathcal{P}[X]^N, \succsim_T^w)$ where \succsim_T^w is a preorder defined as follow: there exist $w_1, w_2 \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$ such that, for any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$,

$\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^w \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $w_1 h_T(\mathbf{Y}) + w_2 g_T(\mathbf{Y}) \geq w_1 h_T(\mathbf{Z}) + w_2 g_T(\mathbf{Z})$.

4.1. More axioms. In order to characterize such composite rankings, we now propose some more axioms:

Axiom 7 (Qualified Independence of Balanced Essential Deletions ($Q-IBED$)). For any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, for any $y, z \in X$ and for any $i \in N$, such that $Y_i \subset T$, $Z_i \subset T$, $y \in Y_i \cap T$ and $z \in Z_i \cap T$:

$\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $(\mathbf{Y}_{-i}, Y_i \setminus \{y\}) \succsim_T (\mathbf{Z}_{-i}, Z_i \setminus \{z\})$.

Axiom 8 (Conditional Dominance (CD)). Let \succsim_T be a poverty ranking with threshold T . Suppose there exist a positive integer k and $f_1, \dots, f_k \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{P}[X]^N}$, such that for all $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, $f_i(\mathbf{Y}) = f_i(\mathbf{Z})$, $i = 1, \dots, k$ entails $\mathbf{Y} \sim_T \mathbf{Z}$. Then, for all $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, $(f_1(\mathbf{Y}), \dots, f_k(\mathbf{Y})) \neq (f_1(\mathbf{Z}), \dots, f_k(\mathbf{Z}))$ and $f_i(\mathbf{Y}) \geq f_i(\mathbf{Z})$, $i = 1, \dots, k$ entails $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$.

Axiom 9 (Non-Compensation (NC)). Let \succsim_T be a poverty ranking with threshold T . Suppose there exist a positive integer k and $f_1, \dots, f_k \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{P}[X]^N}$, such that:

- (i): for all $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$: if $f_i(\mathbf{Y}) = f_i(\mathbf{Z})$, $i = 1, \dots, k$, then $\mathbf{Y} \sim_T \mathbf{Z}$,
- (ii): there exist $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$ and $i^* \in \{1, \dots, k\}$, such that $f_{i^*}(\mathbf{Y}) > f_{i^*}(\mathbf{Z})$ and $f_j(\mathbf{Y}) > f_j(\mathbf{Z})$ for any $j \in \{1, \dots, k\}$, $j \neq i^*$, and $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$.

Then for all $\mathbf{U}, \mathbf{V} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$: $\mathbf{U} \succ_T \mathbf{V}$ whenever $f_{i^*}(\mathbf{U}) > f_{i^*}(\mathbf{V})$.

Axiom 10 (Head-Count Priority (HP)). Let \succsim_T be a poverty ranking with threshold T , such that $\#T \geq 3$. For any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, if [there exist $i, j \in N$ and $x, y, z \in T$, with $x \neq y \neq z \neq x$, such that for any $l \neq i, j$, $Y_l = Z_l$, $Y_i = T \setminus \{x\}$, $Y_j = T \setminus \{y\}$, $Z_i = T$, and $Z_j = \emptyset$], then $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$.

Axiom 11 (Gap-Priority (GP)). Let \succsim_T be a poverty ranking with threshold T , such that $\#T \geq 3$. For any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, if [there exist $i, j \in N$ and $x, y, z \in T$, with $x \neq y \neq z \neq x$, such that for any $l \neq i, j$, $Y_l = Z_l$, $Y_i = T \setminus \{x\}$, $Y_j = T \setminus \{y\}$, $Z_i = T$, and $Z_j = \emptyset$], then $\mathbf{Z} \succ_T \mathbf{Y}$.

Axiom 12 (Cardinal Unit-Comparability (CUC)). Let \succsim_T be a poverty ranking with threshold T . Suppose there exist a positive integer k and $f_1, \dots, f_k \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{P}[X]^N}$, such that for all $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$: if

$f_i(\mathbf{Y}) = f_i(\mathbf{Z}), i = 1, \dots, k$ entails $\mathbf{Y} \sim_T \mathbf{Z}$. Posit

$$\Phi = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \varphi = (\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_k) : \varphi_i \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathbb{R}}, i = 1, \dots, k \text{ such that there exist} \\ \alpha > 0, \beta_i \in \mathbb{R} \text{ with } \varphi_i(x) = \alpha x + \beta_i \text{ for any } x \in \mathbb{R} \end{array} \right\}.$$

Then, for all $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z}, \mathbf{V}, \mathbf{U} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T \mathbf{Z}$, $(f_1(\mathbf{U}), \dots, f_k(\mathbf{U})) = ((\varphi_1 \circ f_1)(\mathbf{Y}), \dots, (\varphi_k \circ f_k)(\mathbf{Y}))$ and $(f_1(\mathbf{V}), \dots, f_k(\mathbf{V})) = ((\varphi_1 \circ f_1)(\mathbf{Z}), \dots, (\varphi_k \circ f_k)(\mathbf{Z}))$ with $\varphi = (\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_k) \in \Phi$ entail $\mathbf{U} \succsim_T \mathbf{V}$.

The *Q-IBED* axiom pertains to the deletion of an essential alternative from the set of a poor individual i in two opportunity profiles \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} . Such balanced deletions preserves the ranking of the two opportunity profiles. This axiom is implied by the axiom introduced before, *Independence of Balanced Essential Deletion*.

In order to compare any two opportunity profiles in terms of poverty, we set a finite number of real-valued evaluation function on $\mathcal{P}[X]^N$. Then, according to the *Conditional Dominance* axiom, if any function evaluates the first distribution as equivalent to the second one, we conclude that both opportunity profiles have the same degree of poverty no matter how we decide to measure it. On the other hand, if all evaluation functions consider the value associated to the first distribution as great as the value associated to the other one, then the *CD* axiom says that we are forced to conclude that the first profile shows at least as much poverty as the second one in terms of opportunity.

Condition *NC* prevents trade-offs among factors and is therefore needed to set the basic feature of lexicographic rankings (see e.g. Fishburn (1975) where a similar condition is introduced in order to characterize lexicographic orderings over products of ordered sets).

The next two axioms propose two different and alternative dominance conditions, based on two basic transformation. Consider a profile \mathbf{Y} and two individuals, i and j , which are just below the poverty thresholds: that is, they miss just one essential opportunity, say x and y respectively. Now consider two different transformations of profile \mathbf{Y} : (i) the transfer of opportunity y from j to i ; (ii) the deletion of one opportunity from the opportunity set available to j . By the joint effect of this double transformation, the number of individuals below the poverty thresholds has decreased, now i is not poor anymore, while j is still poor (poorer than before); however the aggregate number of opportunities that individuals i and j do not have has increased. What is the net effect on our poverty ranking? The answer will depend on the specific weight we give to the number of poor in our society vis a vis to the aggregate severity of poverty. The two axioms we introduce give different and opposite answers: according to the *Head-Count-Priority*, poverty decreases; according to *Gap-Priority*, poverty increases. The final axioms indeed set the basis for a lexicographic combination of the Head Count and Opportunity Gap criteria.

Finally, *Cardinal Unit Comparability* is a quite standard and technical axiom in social choice theory, yielding *utilitarian* social welfare functions. CUC induces an information environment, where admissible transformations are increasing affine functions and, in addition, the scaling unit

must be the same for all individuals. This assumption allows for interpersonal comparisons of differences in the selected parameters (namely, in our case, h_T and g_T). However, parameter levels cannot be compared interpersonally because the intercepts of the affine transformations may differ arbitrarily across individuals.

4.2. More results. Before the characterization of our composite rankings, the following Lemma shows that if a ranking of opportunity profiles satisfies *AN*, *IIO*, *DEP* and *Q – IBED* then, in the case in which two opportunity profiles exhibit the same number of poor and the same aggregate poverty gap, they are declared to be indifferent. In other words, we provide the sufficient conditions because we could select two parameter (namely h_T and g_T) from a finite set of evaluation functions comparing opportunity profiles in terms of poverty.

Lemma 1. *Let \succsim_T be a poverty ranking on $\mathcal{P}[X]^N$ and a total preorder which satisfies AN, IIO, DEP and Q – IBED. Then, for any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, $(h_T(\mathbf{Y}), g_T(\mathbf{Y})) = (h_T(\mathbf{Z}), g_T(\mathbf{Z}))$ entails $\mathbf{Y} \sim_T \mathbf{Z}$.*

We are now able to characterize our composite rankings. The first proposition characterizes the (HG)-lexicographic poverty ranking \succsim_T^{hg} .

Proposition 3. *Let \succsim_T be a poverty ranking of $\mathcal{P}[X]^N$ under threshold $T \subseteq X$, such that $\#T \geq 3$, and a total preorder. Then, $\succsim_T = \succsim_T^{hg}$ if and only if \succsim_T satisfies AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, CD, NC, and HP. Moreover, such a characterization is tight.*

The next proposition characterizes the (GH)-lexicographic poverty ranking \succsim_T^{gh} .

Proposition 4. *Let \succsim_T be a poverty ranking of $\mathcal{P}[X]^N$ under threshold $T \subseteq X$ such that $\#T \geq 3$, and a total preorder. Then, $\succsim_T = \succsim_T^{gh}$ if and only if \succsim_T satisfies AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, CD, NC, and GP. Moreover, such a characterization is tight.*

Our final proposition characterizes the class of (HG)-weighted poverty rankings.

Proposition 5. *Let \succsim_T be a poverty ranking of $\mathcal{P}[X]^N$ under threshold $T \subseteq X$ and a total preorder, and suppose $n > \#T \geq 2$. Then, $\succsim_T = \succsim_T^w$ for some $w = (w_1, w_2) \in (\mathbb{R} \setminus \{0\})^2$ if and only if \succsim_T satisfies AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, CD and CUC. Moreover, such a characterization is tight.*

5. FINAL REMARKS

The need for complementing the traditional evaluation of income poverty by an analysis of the deprivation suffered in many dimensions of individual and social life has been forcefully defended by many economists in the last decades. Such a measurement extension may substantially improve our understanding of the poverty in a society and may well have far-reaching policy implications. To

keep the analysis as general as possible, the different dimensions have been treated in an abstract way: we have defined an opportunity set as any finite set in some arbitrary space and we have attempted to outline an axiomatic theory for the measurement of poverty of opportunity.

We have characterized two fundamental rankings, the Head-Count and the Opportunity-Gap poverty rankings, which generalize the most known poverty measures used in the income poverty framework, namely the *head count ratio* and the *income poverty gap*. In addition, we have characterized axiomatically two lexicographic rankings based on the HC and OG rankings and a third one based on a linear combination of the head-count and gap criteria.

We are aware of the critique of the head-count and poverty-gap measures, formulated by Sen within the income poverty framework, and based on their inability to take into account the inequality among the poor. This critique has led to the characterization of richer families of income poverty indices (see Clarck *et al.* (1981) and Foster *et al.* (1984)). It would be interesting to study such an extension in our setting.

We have only considered comparisons of opportunity profiles for a fixed population. A possible extension of our analysis would be to compare the opportunities available to societies with different numbers of individuals. This would make it possible to rank opportunity profiles for different countries, different demographic groups, and for different time periods.

Finally, the availability of data on poverty makes possible an empirical application based on the rankings characterized in this paper. All these topics will be the object of future research.

6. APPENDIX: PROOFS

Proof of Proposition 1. **(A)** It is straightforward to check that \succsim_T^h is a poverty ranking and does indeed satisfy AN, IIO, DEP and IPOD.

Conversely, suppose \succsim_T is a poverty ranking that satisfies AN, NT, IIO, and IPOD.

Now, consider $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$ such that $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T \mathbf{Z}$. Then, by repeated application of IIO and transitivity, $\mathbf{Y}_{|T} \succsim_T \mathbf{Z}_{|T}$.

Next, observe that $(T^{N \setminus H_T(\mathbf{Y})}, \emptyset^{H_T(\mathbf{Y})}) \sim_T \mathbf{Y}_{|T} \succsim_T \mathbf{Z}_{|T} \sim_T (T^{N \setminus H_T(\mathbf{Z})}, \emptyset^{H_T(\mathbf{Z})})$, by repeated application of IPOD. Let us now suppose that $h_T(\mathbf{Z}) > h_T(\mathbf{Y})$: then, by AN and DEP, $\mathbf{Z} \succ_T \mathbf{Y}$, a contradiction. Hence, $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) \geq h_T(\mathbf{Z})$, i.e. $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^h \mathbf{Z}$.

To prove the reverse inclusion, suppose that $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^h \mathbf{Z}$, i.e. $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) \geq h_T(\mathbf{Z})$. Then, consider $(T^{N \setminus H_T(\mathbf{Y})}, \emptyset^{H_T(\mathbf{Y})})$, $(T^{N \setminus H_T(\mathbf{Z})}, \emptyset^{H_T(\mathbf{Z})})$ and a permutation π of N such that $\pi(H_T(\mathbf{Z})) \subseteq \pi(H_T(\mathbf{Y}))$.

By IIO, $\mathbf{Y} \sim_T (T^{N \setminus H_T(\mathbf{Y})}, \emptyset^{H_T(\mathbf{Y})})$ and $\mathbf{Z} \sim_T (T^{N \setminus H_T(\mathbf{Z})}, \emptyset^{H_T(\mathbf{Z})})$; by AN, $(T^{N \setminus H_T(\mathbf{Y})}, \emptyset^{H_T(\mathbf{Y})}) \sim_T (T^{\pi(N \setminus H_T(\mathbf{Y}))}, \emptyset^{\pi(H_T(\mathbf{Y}))})$ and $(T^{N \setminus H_T(\mathbf{Z})}, \emptyset^{H_T(\mathbf{Z})}) \sim_T (T^{\pi(N \setminus H_T(\mathbf{Z}))}, \emptyset^{\pi(H_T(\mathbf{Z}))})$.

Clearly, if $\pi(H_T(\mathbf{Z})) = \pi(H_T(\mathbf{Y}))$, then $(T^{\pi(N \setminus H_T(\mathbf{Y}))}, \emptyset^{\pi(H_T(\mathbf{Y}))}) = (T^{\pi(N \setminus H_T(\mathbf{Z}))}, \emptyset^{\pi(H_T(\mathbf{Z}))})$, hence, by transitivity of \succsim_T , $\mathbf{Y} \sim_T \mathbf{Z}$.

Let us then suppose that $\pi(H_T(\mathbf{Z})) \subset \pi(H_T(\mathbf{Y}))$. By DEP, it follows that:

$$(T^{\pi(N \setminus H_T(\mathbf{Y}))}, \emptyset^{\pi(H_T(\mathbf{Y}))}) \succ_T (T^{\pi(N \setminus H_T(\mathbf{Z}))}, \emptyset^{\pi(H_T(\mathbf{Z}))}),$$

hence, in particular, $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$.

(B) The characterization provided above is tight. To check the validity of this claim, consider the following examples.

i) To begin with, consider the non-anonymous refinement of HG defined by the following rule: $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^{h_1} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if:

- a) $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^h \mathbf{Z}$ and $\{Y_i, Z_i\} \subseteq \{T, \emptyset\}$ for each $i \in N$ or
- b) $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^h \mathbf{Z}$ or
- c) $\mathbf{Y} \sim_T^h \mathbf{Z}$, there exist $i, j \in N$ such $\{Y_i, Z_j\} \cap \{T, \emptyset\} = \emptyset$, and $Y_1 \not\supseteq T$.

Clearly, $\succ_T^{h_1}$ is a poverty ranking that satisfies IIO, IPOD and DEP, but violates AN.

ii) Consider the refinement of HC defined by the following rule: $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^{h^*} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^h \mathbf{Z}$ or $\mathbf{Y} \sim_T^h \mathbf{Z}$ and $\#\{i \in N : Y_i \supset T\} \leq \#\{i \in N : Z_i \supset T\}$. Such a preorder is a poverty ranking that satisfies AN, DEP and IPOD but violates IIO.

iii) Consider the universal indifference poverty ranking: i.e. $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^I \mathbf{Z}$ for any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$. That ranking does satisfy AN, IIO and IPOD but violates DEP.

iv) Consider the OG-refinement of HC as defined by the following rule: $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^{h_g} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if either $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^h \mathbf{Z}$ or $(\mathbf{Y} \sim_T^h \mathbf{Z} \text{ and } g_T(\mathbf{Y}) \geq g_T(\mathbf{Z}))$. Such a preorder is a poverty ranking that satisfies AN, IIO and DEP, but fails to satisfy IPOD. \square

Proof of Proposition 2. (A) It is easily checked that \succ_T^g is a poverty ranking and does satisfy AN, IIO, SMED and IBED.

Conversely, suppose \succ_T is a poverty ranking that satisfies AN, IIO, SMED and IBED.

Then, consider $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$ such that $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$. Again, by repeated application of IIO and transitivity, $\mathbf{Y}_{|T} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}_{|T}$. Now, suppose that $g_T(\mathbf{Z}) > g_T(\mathbf{Y})$. Then, by repeated application of IBED, $\mathbf{Z}'_{|T} \sim_T \mathbf{Y}_{|T}$ for some \mathbf{Z}' such that $Z'_i \subseteq Z_i$ for each $i \in N$, and $g_T(\mathbf{Z}') = g_T(\mathbf{Y})$. It follows that, by repeated application of SMED, $\mathbf{Z}_{|T} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}'_{|T}$, hence by transitivity, $\mathbf{Z}_{|T} \succ_T \mathbf{Y}_{|T}$. Thus, by repeated application of IIO and transitivity again, $\mathbf{Z} \succ_T \mathbf{Y}$, a contradiction.

On the other hand, suppose that $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^g \mathbf{Z}$, i.e. $g_T(\mathbf{Y}) \geq g_T(\mathbf{Z})$, and consider $\mathbf{T} = (T, \dots, T) \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$. Of course, $\mathbf{T} \sim_T \mathbf{T}$, by reflexivity. Then, by AN and repeated application of IBED to $\mathbf{T} \sim_T \mathbf{T}$, it follows that $\mathbf{Y}' \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$ for some \mathbf{Y}' such that $Y'_i \setminus T = Y_i \setminus T$ and $Y_i \subseteq Y'_i$ for each $i \in N$, and $g_T(\mathbf{Y}') = g_T(\mathbf{Z})$. If, in particular, $g_T(\mathbf{Y}') = g_T(\mathbf{Y})$ then $\mathbf{Y}' = \mathbf{Y}$, hence $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$, and we are done. Otherwise, there exist $i \in N$ and $x \in T \cap (Y'_i \setminus Y_i)$, hence $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$ by transitivity and repeated application of SMED. In any case, $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$ as required.

(B) The foregoing characterization is also tight. To verify that claim consider the following examples.

i) Take the following non-anonymous refinement of the OG poverty ranking: $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^{g_1} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^g \mathbf{Z}$ or $(\mathbf{Y} \sim_T^g \mathbf{Z}, Y_1 \not\supseteq T \text{ and } Z_1 \cap T \supseteq Y_1 \cap T)$. That ranking satisfies IIO, SMED and IBED but fails to satisfy AN.

ii) Consider the following refinement of the OG poverty ranking: $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^{g^*} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^g \mathbf{Z}$ or $(\mathbf{Y} \sim_T^g \mathbf{Z} \text{ and } \sum_{i \in N} \#(Y_i \setminus T) \leq \sum_{i \in N} \#(Z_i \setminus T))$. That ranking satisfies AN, SMED and IBED but fails to satisfy IIO.

iii) Consider again the universal indifference ranking: i.e. $\mathbf{Y} \succsim^I \mathbf{Z}$ for any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$. That preorder is a poverty ranking which does satisfy AN, IIO and IBED but violates SMED.

iv) Consider the HC-refinement of the OG poverty ranking: $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^{g_h} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^g \mathbf{Z}$ or $(\mathbf{Y} \sim_T^g \mathbf{Z} \text{ and } h_T(\mathbf{Y}) \geq h_T(\mathbf{Z}))$. That poverty ranking satisfies AN, IIO, SMED but violates IBED. \square

Proof of Lemma 2. Let us suppose $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) = h_T(\mathbf{Z})$, $g_T(\mathbf{Y}) = g_T(\mathbf{Z})$. Also, notice that for any $\mathbf{U} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, $h_T(\mathbf{U}) = h_T(\mathbf{U}_{|T})$ and $g_T(\mathbf{U}) = g_T(\mathbf{U}_{|T})$ by definition of h_T and g_T respectively. Therefore, $h_T(\mathbf{Y}_{|T}) = h_T(\mathbf{Z}_{|T}) = m$ and $g_T(\mathbf{Y}_{|T}) = g_T(\mathbf{Z}_{|T}) = k$ for some m, k non-negative (observe that $m = 0$ if and only if $k = 0$). Next, posit $\tilde{\mathbf{V}} = (\tilde{V}_i)_{i=1, \dots, n}$ with $\tilde{V}_i = T$ if $V_i \supseteq T$, and $\tilde{V}_i = \emptyset$ if $V_i \not\supseteq T$ and note that $h_T(\mathbf{V}_{|T}) = h_T(\tilde{\mathbf{V}})$ since $\tilde{\mathbf{V}}$ does not alter the set of poor population units in $\mathbf{V}_{|T}$. Next, $\mathbf{Y}_{|T} \succsim_T \mathbf{Z}_{|T}$ if and only if $\tilde{\mathbf{Y}} \succsim_T \tilde{\mathbf{Z}}$ by AN and a repeated application of $Q - IBED$ ($(m|T| - k)$ times). Moreover, since $h_T(\tilde{\mathbf{Y}}) = h_T(\tilde{\mathbf{Z}})$, it follows by DEP that neither $\tilde{\mathbf{Y}} \succ_T \tilde{\mathbf{Z}}$ nor $\tilde{\mathbf{Z}} \succ_T \tilde{\mathbf{Y}}$. Therefore, $\tilde{\mathbf{Y}} \sim_T \tilde{\mathbf{Z}}$ because \succsim_T is a total preorder. Finally, $\mathbf{Y} \sim_T \mathbf{Y}_{|T}$ and $\mathbf{Z} \sim_T \mathbf{Z}_{|T}$ by repeated applications of IIO. It follows, by transitivity, that $\mathbf{Y} \sim_T \mathbf{Z}$. \square

Proof of Proposition 3. (A) Again, it is easily checked that \succsim_T^{hg} does indeed satisfy AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, CD, NC and HP.

On the other hand, let \succsim_T be a poverty ranking and a total preorder that satisfies AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, CD, NC and HP.

Let $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, such that $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^{hg} \mathbf{Z}$, then one of the following cases obtains:

- a) $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) > h_T(\mathbf{Z})$ and $g_T(\mathbf{Y}) = g_T(\mathbf{Z})$
- b) $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) > h_T(\mathbf{Z})$ and $g_T(\mathbf{Y}) > g_T(\mathbf{Z})$
- c) $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) > h_T(\mathbf{Z})$ and $g_T(\mathbf{Z}) > g_T(\mathbf{Y})$
- d) $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) = h_T(\mathbf{Z})$ and $g_T(\mathbf{Y}) > g_T(\mathbf{Z})$
- e) $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) = h_T(\mathbf{Z})$ and $g_T(\mathbf{Y}) = g_T(\mathbf{Z})$

Under case a) b), d) $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$ by *CD*. Under case c), $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$ by Lemma 1 and *NC* and *HP*. In e) by Lemma 1 $\mathbf{Y} \sim_T \mathbf{Z}$. Hence, in any case, $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T \mathbf{Z}$.

Conversely, let $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, such that $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T \mathbf{Z}$, then the following cases should be distinguished:

- 1) $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) > h_T(\mathbf{Z})$
- 2) $h_T(\mathbf{Z}) > h_T(\mathbf{Y})$
- 3) $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) = h_T(\mathbf{Z})$ and $g_T(\mathbf{Y}) > g_T(\mathbf{Z})$
- 4) $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) = h_T(\mathbf{Z})$ and $g_T(\mathbf{Z}) > g_T(\mathbf{Y})$
- 5) $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) = h_T(\mathbf{Z})$ and $g_T(\mathbf{Z}) = g_T(\mathbf{Y})$.

Under case 1), 3), $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^{hg} \mathbf{Z}$ by definition. Under case 2), two subcases should be distinguished, namely either $g_T(\mathbf{Z}) \geq g_T(\mathbf{Y})$ or $g_T(\mathbf{Y}) > g_T(\mathbf{Z})$. If $g_T(\mathbf{Z}) \geq g_T(\mathbf{Y})$ then by *CD* $\mathbf{Z} \succ_T \mathbf{Y}$, a contradiction. If, on the contrary, $g_T(\mathbf{Y}) > g_T(\mathbf{Z})$ then, by Lemma 1 and *NC* and *HP*, $\mathbf{Z} \succ_T \mathbf{Y}$ a contradiction again. Moreover, under case 4) by *CD* $\mathbf{Z} \succ_T \mathbf{Y}$, a contradiction. Finally, under case 5), we have that $\mathbf{Y} \sim_T^{hg} \mathbf{Z}$ by definition. Hence, the desired result follows.

(B) The characterization of \succsim_T^{hg} provided above is tight. Indeed, consider the following examples:

i) Take the following non-anonymous refinement of the *(HG)*- lexicographic poverty ranking: $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^{hg1} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^{hg} \mathbf{Z}$ or $(\mathbf{Y} \sim_T^{hg} \mathbf{Z}, \{Y_1, \dots, Y_n, Z_1, \dots, Z_n\} \not\subseteq \{T, \emptyset\} \text{ and } \#(Y_1 \cap T) \leq \#(Z_1 \cap T))$. That ranking is a total preorder that satisfies *IIO*, *DEP*, *Q-IBED*, *CD*, *NC* and *HP* but fails to satisfy *AN*.

ii) Consider the following refinement of the *(HG)*- lexicographic poverty ranking: $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^{hg2} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^{hg} \mathbf{Z}$ or $(\mathbf{Y} \sim_T^{hg} \mathbf{Z} \text{ and } \sum_{i \in N} \#(Y_i \setminus T) \leq \sum_{i \in N} \#(Z_i \setminus T))$. That ranking is a total preorder that satisfies *AN*, *DEP*, *Q-IBED*, *CD*, *NC* and *HP* but fails to satisfy *IIO*.

iii) Consider the following poverty ranking: $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^{hg3} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $\sum_{i \in N, Y_i \not\subseteq T} \#(Y_i \cap T) \geq \sum_{i \in N, Z_i \not\subseteq T} \#(Z_i \cap T)$. That ranking is a total preorder that satisfies *AN*, *IIO*, *Q-IBED*, *CD*, *NC* and *HP* but fails to satisfy *DEP*.

iv) Choose $x^* \in T$, and consider the following refinement of the *(HG)*- lexicographic poverty ranking: $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^{hg4} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^{hg} \mathbf{Z}$ or $(\mathbf{Y} \sim_T^{hg} \mathbf{Z} \text{ and either } [x^* \in (Y_{i^*} \cap Z_{j^*})] \text{ or } [x^* \notin Y_{i^*}])$, where $i^* = \min \{i \in N : Y_i \not\subseteq T\}$ and $j^* = \min \{i \in N : Z_i \not\subseteq T\}$. That ranking is a total preorder that satisfies *AN*, *IIO*, *DEP*, *CD*, *NC* and *HP* but fails to satisfy *Q-IBED*.

v) Consider the following poverty ranking: $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^{hg5} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if either $[\{Y_i, Z_i\} \subseteq \{T, \emptyset\}]$ for each $i \in N$ or $[\text{there exists } i \in N \text{ such that } Y_i \not\subseteq \{T, \emptyset\}]$. It can be shown that \succsim_T^{hg5} is indeed a total preorder: moreover, it satisfies *AN*, *IIO*, *DEP*, *Q-IBED*, *NC* and *HP* but not *CD*.

vi) Consider the following poverty ranking: $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^{hg6} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $w_1 \cdot h_T(\mathbf{Y}) + w_2 \cdot g_T(\mathbf{Y}) \geq w_1 \cdot h_T(\mathbf{Z}) + w_2 \cdot g_T(\mathbf{Z})$ with $w_1 = t - 2 + \epsilon$, $\epsilon \in \mathbb{R}_+ \setminus \{0\}$, $\epsilon \approx 0$, and $w_2 = 1$. It can be shown that \succsim_T^{hg6} is a total preorder that satisfies *AN*, *IIO*, *DEP*, *Q-IBED*, *CD*, and *HP* but fails to satisfy *NC*.

vii) Consider the poverty ranking \succsim_T^{gh} : clearly enough, it is a total preorder that satisfies *AN*, *IIO*, *DEP*, *Q-IBED*, *CD*, and *NC*, but not *HP*. \square

Proof of Proposition 4. **(A)** The proof replicates almost verbatim the previous one. We reproduce it here for the sake of completeness.

It is easily checked that \succsim_T^{gh} does indeed satisfy AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, CD, NC and GP.

On the other hand, let \succsim_T be a poverty ranking and a total preorder that satisfies AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, CD, NC and GP.

Let $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, such that $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^{gh} \mathbf{Z}$, then one of the following cases obtains:

- a) $g_T(\mathbf{Y}) > g_T(\mathbf{Z})$ and $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) = h_T(\mathbf{Z})$
- b) $g_T(\mathbf{Y}) > g_T(\mathbf{Z})$ and $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) > h_T(\mathbf{Z})$
- c) $g_T(\mathbf{Y}) > g_T(\mathbf{Z})$ and $h_T(\mathbf{Z}) > h_T(\mathbf{Y})$
- d) $g_T(\mathbf{Y}) = g_T(\mathbf{Z})$ and $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) > h_T(\mathbf{Z})$
- e) $g_T(\mathbf{Y}) = g_T(\mathbf{Z})$ and $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) = h_T(\mathbf{Z})$

Under case a) b), d) $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$ by *CD*. Under case c), $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$ by Lemma 1 and *NC* and *HP*. In e) by Lemma 1 $\mathbf{Y} \sim_T \mathbf{Z}$. Hence, in any case, $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T \mathbf{Z}$.

Conversely, let $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, such that $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T \mathbf{Z}$, then the following cases should be distinguished:

- 1) $g_T(\mathbf{Y}) > g_T(\mathbf{Z})$
- 2) $g_T(\mathbf{Z}) > g_T(\mathbf{Y})$
- 3) $g_T(\mathbf{Y}) = g_T(\mathbf{Z})$ and $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) > h_T(\mathbf{Z})$
- 4) $g_T(\mathbf{Y}) = g_T(\mathbf{Z})$ and $h_T(\mathbf{Z}) > h_T(\mathbf{Y})$
- 5) $g_T(\mathbf{Y}) = g_T(\mathbf{Z})$ and $h_T(\mathbf{Z}) = h_T(\mathbf{Y})$.

Under case 1), 3), $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^{gh} \mathbf{Z}$ by definition. Under case 2), two subcases should be distinguished, namely either $h_T(\mathbf{Z}) \geq h_T(\mathbf{Y})$ or $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) > h_T(\mathbf{Z})$. If $h_T(\mathbf{Z}) \geq h_T(\mathbf{Y})$ then, by *CD*, $\mathbf{Z} \succ_T \mathbf{Y}$, a contradiction. If, on the contrary, $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) > h_T(\mathbf{Z})$ then, by Lemma 1 and *NC* and *GP*, $\mathbf{Z} \succ_T \mathbf{Y}$ a contradiction again. Moreover, under case 4), by *CD*, $\mathbf{Z} \succ_T \mathbf{Y}$ a contradiction. Finally, under case 5), we have that $\mathbf{Y} \sim_T^{gh} \mathbf{Z}$ by definition. Hence, the desired result.

(B) The characterization of \succsim_T^{gh} provided above is also tight. Indeed, consider the following examples.

i) Take the following non-anonymous refinement of the *(GH)*- lexicographic poverty ranking: $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^{gh_1} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^{gh} \mathbf{Z}$ or $(\mathbf{Y} \sim_T^{gh} \mathbf{Z}, \{Y_1, \dots, Y_n, Z_1, \dots, Z_n\} \not\subseteq \{T, \emptyset\} \text{ and } \#(Y_1 \cap T) \leq \#(Z_1 \cap T))$. That ranking is a total preorder that satisfies IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, CD, NC and GP but fails to satisfy AN.

ii) Consider the following refinement of the *(GH)*- lexicographic poverty ranking: $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^{gh_2} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^{gh} \mathbf{Z}$ or $(\mathbf{Y} \sim_T^{gh} \mathbf{Z} \text{ and } \sum_{i \in N} \#(Y_i \setminus T) \leq \sum_{i \in N} \#(Z_i \setminus T))$. That ranking is a total preorder that satisfies AN, DEP, Q-IBED, CD, NC and GP but fails to satisfy IIO.

iii) Consider the following poverty ranking: $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^{gh_3} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $\sum_{i \in N, Y_i \not\subseteq T} \#(Y_i \cap T) \leq \sum_{i \in N, Z_i \not\subseteq T} \#(Z_i \cap T)$. That ranking is a total preorder that satisfies AN, IIO, Q-IBED, CD, NC and GP but fails to satisfy DEP.

iv) Choose $x^* \in T$, and consider the following refinement of the (GH) -lexicographic poverty ranking: $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^{gh_4} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^{gh} \mathbf{Z}$ or $(\mathbf{Y} \sim_T^{gh} \mathbf{Z}$ and either $[x^* \in (Y_{i^*} \cap Z_{j^*})]$ or $[x^* \notin Y_{i^*}]$, where $i^* = \min\{i \in N : Y_i \not\supseteq T\}$ and $j^* = \min\{i \in N : Z_i \not\supseteq T\}$). That ranking is a total preorder that satisfies AN, IIO, DEP, CD, NC and GP but fails to satisfy Q-IBED.

v) Consider the following poverty ranking: $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^{gh_5} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if either $[\{Y_i, Z_i\} \subseteq \{T, \emptyset\}]$ for each $i \in N$ or $[\text{there exists } i \in N \text{ such that } Z_i \notin \{T, \emptyset\}]$. It can be shown that $\succsim_T^{gh_5}$ is indeed a total preorder: moreover, it satisfies AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, NC and HP but not CD.

vi) Consider the following poverty ranking: $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T^{gh_6} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $w_1 \cdot h_T(\mathbf{Y}) + w_2 \cdot g_T(\mathbf{Y}) \geq w_1 \cdot h_T(\mathbf{Z}) + w_2 \cdot g_T(\mathbf{Z})$ with $w_1 = t - 2 - \epsilon$, $\epsilon \in \mathbb{R}_+ \setminus \{0\}$, $\epsilon \approx 0$, and $w_2 = 1$. It can be shown that $\succsim_T^{gh_6}$ is a total preorder that satisfies AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, CD, and GP but fails to satisfy NC.

vii) Consider the poverty ranking \succsim_T^{hg} : clearly, it is a total preorder that satisfies AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, CD, and NC, but not GP. \square

Proof of Proposition 5. **(A)** Checking that \succsim_T^w is a poverty ranking which satisfies AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, CD, and CUC is straightforward. Then, we only need to prove the ‘if’ part.

First, notice that for any $\mathbf{Y} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, $h_T(\mathbf{Y})$, $g_T(\mathbf{Y}) \in \mathbb{Z}_+$, $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) \leq n$, and $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) \leq g_T(\mathbf{Y}) \leq n \cdot t$, where $t = \#T$. Now, take any poverty ranking \succsim_T that is a total preorder and satisfies AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, CD, and CUC.

We distinguish two basic cases, namely:

Case I: There exist $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, such that $A = (h_T(\mathbf{Y}), g_T(\mathbf{Y})) \neq (h_T(\mathbf{Z}), g_T(\mathbf{Z})) = B$ and $\mathbf{Y} \sim_T \mathbf{Z}$.

Then, observe that all points lying on line joining A and B are \sim_T indifferent. Indeed, $A \sim_T B$ by hypothesis. Then, $A - A \sim_T B - A$, i.e. $O \sim_T B - A$ by CUC. Hence, for any $\lambda > 0$, $O \sim_T \lambda(B - A)$ by CUC, which, in turn, entails $A \sim_T \lambda(B - A) + A$. Similarly, $O \sim_T B - A$ implies that $-(B - A) \sim_T O$. Then, for any $\lambda > 0$, $\lambda(-(B - A)) \sim_T O$, entails $A + \lambda(-(B - A)) \sim_T A$. Let us denote $w_1 x + w_2 y = k$, with $w_1, w_2 \in \mathbb{R}_+ \setminus \{0\}$ and $k \in \mathbb{R}$ the real line joining \mathbf{Y} and \mathbf{Z} . Moreover, observe that by CUC, $E = (h_T(\mathbf{Y}) + \delta_1, g_T(\mathbf{Y}) + \delta_2) \sim_T (h_T(\mathbf{Z}) + \delta_1, g_T(\mathbf{Z}) + \delta_2) = D$ for any $\delta_1, \delta_2 \in \mathbb{R}$. Therefore, all proper indifference curves are parallel to each other. Of course, there might exist a finite number of isolated points. But, then for each one of them, one can draw a line through it which is parallel to the other indifference curves. Finally, notice that by CD $\mathbf{U} \succsim_T \mathbf{V}$ whenever $w_1 h_T(\mathbf{U}) + w_2 g_T(\mathbf{U}) = k_1$, $w_1 h_T(\mathbf{V}) + w_2 g_T(\mathbf{V}) = k_2$ and $k_1 > k_2$. Therefore, $\succsim_T = \succsim_T^w$ by definition of \succsim_T^w .

Case II: There is no pair $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$ such that $(h_T(\mathbf{Y}), g_T(\mathbf{Y})) \neq (h_T(\mathbf{Z}), g_T(\mathbf{Z}))$ and $\mathbf{Y} \sim_T \mathbf{Z}$, hence for any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$ such that $(h_T(\mathbf{Y}), g_T(\mathbf{Y})) \neq (h_T(\mathbf{Z}), g_T(\mathbf{Z}))$ either $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T \mathbf{Z}$ or $\mathbf{Z} \succsim_T \mathbf{Y}$.

Of course, if $(h_T(\mathbf{Y}), g_T(\mathbf{Y})) = (h_T(\mathbf{Z}), g_T(\mathbf{Z}))$ then $w_1 h_T(\mathbf{Y}) + w_2 g_T(\mathbf{Y}) = w_1 h_T(\mathbf{Z}) + w_2 g_T(\mathbf{Z})$ for any $w_1, w_2 \in \mathbb{R}_+$, and, by Lemma 1, $\mathbf{Y} \sim_T \mathbf{Z}$. Moreover, if $(h_T(\mathbf{Y}), g_T(\mathbf{Y})) \geq (h_T(\mathbf{Z}), g_T(\mathbf{Z}))$ and $(h_T(\mathbf{Y}), g_T(\mathbf{Y})) \neq (h_T(\mathbf{Z}), g_T(\mathbf{Z}))$, then $w_1 h_T(\mathbf{Y}) + w_2 g_T(\mathbf{Y}) > w_1 h_T(\mathbf{Z}) + w_2 g_T(\mathbf{Z})$ for any $w_1, w_2 \in \mathbb{R}_+ \setminus \{0\}$, and, by CD, $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$.

Therefore, it suffices to check pairs $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$ such that either:

- i) $h_T(\mathbf{Y}) > h_T(\mathbf{Z})$ and $g_T(\mathbf{Z}) > g_T(\mathbf{Y})$ (also denoted, relying on an obvious choice of a Cartesian coordinate system in the real plane, as $\mathbf{Z} \in NW(\mathbf{Y})$ i.e. ‘ \mathbf{Z} is North-West of \mathbf{Y} ’) or
- ii) $h_T(\mathbf{Z}) > h_T(\mathbf{Y})$ and $g_T(\mathbf{Y}) > g_T(\mathbf{Z})$ (also denoted as $\mathbf{Y} \in NW(\mathbf{Z})$ i.e. ‘ \mathbf{Y} is North-West of \mathbf{Z} ’).

First, consider any \succsim_T such that for any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T \mathbf{Z}$ whenever $\mathbf{Y} \in NW(\mathbf{Z})$.

It is clearly the case that $w_1 h_T(\mathbf{Y}) + w_2 g_T(\mathbf{Y}) > w_1 h_T(\mathbf{Z}) + w_2 g_T(\mathbf{Z})$ for any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$ such that $\mathbf{Y} \in NW(\mathbf{Z})$, provided

$w_2(g_T(\mathbf{Y}) - g_T(\mathbf{Z})) > w_1(h_T(\mathbf{Z}) - h_T(\mathbf{Y}))$ or equivalently whenever $\frac{w_2}{w_1} > n - 1$, i.e. $\frac{w_1}{w_2} < \frac{1}{n-1}$, since $\frac{h_T(\mathbf{Z}) - h_T(\mathbf{Y})}{g_T(\mathbf{Y}) - g_T(\mathbf{Z})} \leq n - 1$ for any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$ such that $\mathbf{Y} \in NW(\mathbf{Z})$.

Now, consider any \succsim_T such that for any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, $\mathbf{Y} \succsim_T \mathbf{Z}$ whenever $\mathbf{Z} \in NW(\mathbf{Y})$.

Clearly, $w_1 h_T(\mathbf{Y}) + w_2 g_T(\mathbf{Y}) > w_1 h_T(\mathbf{Z}) + w_2 g_T(\mathbf{Z})$ for any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$ such that $\mathbf{Z} \in NW(\mathbf{Y})$, provided $w_1(h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})) > w_2(g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y}))$, i.e. whenever $\frac{w_1}{w_2} > n \cdot (t - 1) - t$ since $\frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})} \leq (n - 1) \cdot t - n = n \cdot (t - 1) - t$ for any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$ such that $\mathbf{Z} \in NW(\mathbf{Y})$.

Therefore, it only remains to be considered the case of a total preorder \succsim_T with the required properties such that there exist $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z}, \mathbf{Y}', \mathbf{Z}' \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, with $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$ and $\mathbf{Y}' \succ_T \mathbf{Z}'$, while $\mathbf{Y} \in NW(\mathbf{Z})$ and $\mathbf{Z}' \in NW(\mathbf{Y}')$. In this case, posit $m^- = \max \left\{ \frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})} : \mathbf{Z} \in NW(\mathbf{Y}) \text{ and } \mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z} \right\}$ and $m^+ = \min \left\{ \frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}') - g_T(\mathbf{Y}')}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}') - h_T(\mathbf{Z}')} : \mathbf{Z}' \in NW(\mathbf{Y}') \text{ and } \mathbf{Z}' \succ_T \mathbf{Y}' \right\}$ (notice that m^+ and m^- are both well defined under our special hypothesis on \succsim_T).

Next, we shall prove that $m^- < m^+$ (the proof is along the same lines of that provided in Alcalde-Unzu and Ballester (2005): we reproduce it here for the sake of completeness).

Indeed, let us first suppose that $m^- = m^+$. Then, there exist $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z}, \mathbf{Y}', \mathbf{Z}' \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$ such that $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$ and $\mathbf{Z}' \succ_T \mathbf{Y}'$, $\mathbf{Z} \in NW(\mathbf{Y})$ and $\mathbf{Z}' \in NW(\mathbf{Y}')$, while $\frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})} = \frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}') - g_T(\mathbf{Y}')}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}') - h_T(\mathbf{Z}')} = \rho > 0$.

Then, by some straightforward algebraic manipulations it follows that:

$$\begin{aligned} h_T(\mathbf{Y}') &= \left[\frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}') - g_T(\mathbf{Y}')}{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})} \right] \cdot h_T(\mathbf{Y}) + \left[h_T(\mathbf{Z}') - (h_T(\mathbf{Z}) \cdot \frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}') - g_T(\mathbf{Y}')}{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})}) \right] \\ h_T(\mathbf{Z}') &= \left[\frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}') - g_T(\mathbf{Y}')}{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})} \right] \cdot h_T(\mathbf{Z}) + \left[h_T(\mathbf{Y}') - (h_T(\mathbf{Y}) \cdot \frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}') - g_T(\mathbf{Y}')}{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})}) \right] \\ g_T(\mathbf{Y}') &= \left[\frac{h_T(\mathbf{Y}') - h_T(\mathbf{Z}')}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})} \right] \cdot g_T(\mathbf{Y}) + \left[g_T(\mathbf{Z}') - (g_T(\mathbf{Z}) \cdot \frac{h_T(\mathbf{Y}') - h_T(\mathbf{Z}')}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})}) \right] \\ g_T(\mathbf{Z}') &= \left[\frac{h_T(\mathbf{Y}') - h_T(\mathbf{Z}')}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})} \right] \cdot g_T(\mathbf{Z}) + \left[g_T(\mathbf{Y}') - (g_T(\mathbf{Y}) \cdot \frac{h_T(\mathbf{Y}') - h_T(\mathbf{Z}')}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})}) \right]. \end{aligned}$$

Notice that $\frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z})-g_T(\mathbf{Y})}{h_T(\mathbf{Y})-h_T(\mathbf{Z})} = \frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}')-g_T(\mathbf{Y}')}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}')-h_T(\mathbf{Z}')} clearly implies $\frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}')-g_T(\mathbf{Y}')}{g_T(\mathbf{Z})-g_T(\mathbf{Y})} = \frac{h_T(\mathbf{Y}')-h_T(\mathbf{Z}')}{h_T(\mathbf{Y})-h_T(\mathbf{Z})}$ whence$

$$\begin{aligned} \left[h_T(\mathbf{Z}') - (h_T(\mathbf{Z}) \cdot \frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}') - g_T(\mathbf{Y}')}{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})}) \right] &= \left[h_T(\mathbf{Y}') - (h_T(\mathbf{Y}) \cdot \frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}') - g_T(\mathbf{Y}')}{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})}) \right] = \\ &= \frac{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) \cdot h_T(\mathbf{Z}') - h_T(\mathbf{Y}') \cdot h_T(\mathbf{Z})}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})}, \\ \text{and } \left[g_T(\mathbf{Z}') - (g_T(\mathbf{Z}) \cdot \frac{h_T(\mathbf{Y}') - h_T(\mathbf{Z}')}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})}) \right] &= \left[g_T(\mathbf{Y}') - (g_T(\mathbf{Y}) \cdot \frac{h_T(\mathbf{Y}') - h_T(\mathbf{Z}')}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})}) \right] = \\ &= \frac{g_T(\mathbf{Y}') \cdot g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y}) \cdot g_T(\mathbf{Z}')}{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$(h_T(\mathbf{Y}'), g_T(\mathbf{Y}')) = (\alpha \cdot h_T(\mathbf{Y}) + \beta_1, \alpha \cdot g_T(\mathbf{Y}) + \beta_2) \text{ and}$$

$$(h_T(\mathbf{Z}'), g_T(\mathbf{Z}')) = (\alpha \cdot h_T(\mathbf{Z}) + \beta_1, \alpha \cdot g_T(\mathbf{Z}) + \beta_2)$$

$$\text{with } \alpha = \frac{h_T(\mathbf{Y}') - h_T(\mathbf{Z}')}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})} > 0, \beta_1 = \frac{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) \cdot h_T(\mathbf{Z}') - h_T(\mathbf{Y}') \cdot h_T(\mathbf{Z})}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})}, \beta_2 = \frac{g_T(\mathbf{Y}') \cdot g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y}) \cdot g_T(\mathbf{Z}')}{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})}.$$

Thus, CUC applies and $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$ implies $\mathbf{Y}' \succ_T \mathbf{Z}'$, a contradiction.

Suppose then that $m^- = \frac{p}{q} > \frac{r}{s} = m^+$ with both $\frac{p}{q}$ and $\frac{r}{s}$ irreducible fractions. Let us consider a few exhaustive subcases, namely

i) $p \geq r, q \leq s$. Clearly, it must be the case that $p > r$ or $q < s$ (or both). Then, one may select $\mathbf{U}, \mathbf{V} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$ such that $\mathbf{U} \in NW(\mathbf{V})$ and $\frac{g_T(\mathbf{U}) - g_T(\mathbf{V})}{h_T(\mathbf{V}) - h_T(\mathbf{U})} = \frac{r}{q}$.

If $p = r$ then $q < s$, hence $m^- = \frac{r}{q} > m^+$: thus, consider $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$ such that $\mathbf{Y} \in NW(\mathbf{Z})$ and $\frac{g_T(\mathbf{Y}) - g_T(\mathbf{Z})}{h_T(\mathbf{Z}) - h_T(\mathbf{Y})} = m^-$. By definition of m^- , $\mathbf{Z} \succ_T \mathbf{Y}$. But then, by applying to the pairs $(\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z}), (\mathbf{U}, \mathbf{V})$ the very same argument used above for excluding $m^- = m^+$, and repeating the same calculations, it follows that CUC applies to the effect of implying $\mathbf{V} \succ_T \mathbf{U}$, hence indeed $\mathbf{V} \succ_T \mathbf{U}$ in view of the general hypothesis of **Case II** we are considering now. On the other hand, consider $\mathbf{Y}', \mathbf{Z}', \mathbf{V}' \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, such that $\mathbf{Y}' \in NW(\mathbf{Z}')$, $\mathbf{Y}' \succ_T \mathbf{Z}'$,

$$\frac{g_T(\mathbf{Y}') - g_T(\mathbf{Z}')}{h_T(\mathbf{Z}') - h_T(\mathbf{Y}')} = \frac{r}{s} = \frac{g_T(\mathbf{U}) - g_T(\mathbf{V}')}{h_T(\mathbf{V}') - h_T(\mathbf{U})} = m^+ < \frac{r}{q} = \frac{g_T(\mathbf{U}) - g_T(\mathbf{V})}{h_T(\mathbf{V}) - h_T(\mathbf{U})},$$

$g_T(\mathbf{U}) - g_T(\mathbf{V}') = r$, and $g_T(\mathbf{V}') = g_T(\mathbf{V})$. Hence, by the same argument as above, CUC applies and implies $\mathbf{U} \succ_T \mathbf{V}'$ (in fact, $\mathbf{U} \succ_T \mathbf{V}'$). Moreover,

$$h_T(\mathbf{V}') = h_T(\mathbf{U}) + s = h_T(\mathbf{U}) + (s - q) + h_T(\mathbf{V}) - h_T(\mathbf{U}) = h_T(\mathbf{V}) + (s - q) > h_T(\mathbf{V}).$$

Thus, by CD, $\mathbf{V}' \succ_T \mathbf{V}$ and by transitivity $\mathbf{U} \succ_T \mathbf{V}$, a contradiction.

If $q = s$ then $p > r$, hence $m^- > \frac{r}{s} = m^+$: consider $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, such that $\mathbf{Y} \in NW(\mathbf{Z})$ and $\frac{g_T(\mathbf{Y}) - g_T(\mathbf{Z})}{h_T(\mathbf{Z}) - h_T(\mathbf{Y})} = m^-$. By definition of m^- , $\mathbf{Z} \succ_T \mathbf{Y}$. But then, by applying again to the pairs $(\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z}), (\mathbf{U}, \mathbf{V})$ the same argument used above for excluding $m^- = m^+$, and repeating the same calculations, it follows that CUC applies, implying $\mathbf{U} \succ_T \mathbf{V}$, hence indeed $\mathbf{U} \succ_T \mathbf{V}$ in

view of the general hypothesis of **Case II** we are considering now. On the other hand, consider $\mathbf{Y}', \mathbf{Z}', \mathbf{U}' \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, such that $\mathbf{Y}' \in NW(\mathbf{Z}')$, $\mathbf{Y}' \succ_T \mathbf{Z}'$,

$$\frac{g_T(\mathbf{Y}') - g_T(\mathbf{Z}')}{h_T(\mathbf{Z}') - h_T(\mathbf{Y}')} = \frac{r}{q} = \frac{g_T(\mathbf{V}) - g_T(\mathbf{U})}{h_T(\mathbf{V}) - h_T(\mathbf{U})} = m^+ < \frac{p}{q} = \frac{g_T(\mathbf{U}') - g_T(\mathbf{V})}{h_T(\mathbf{V}) - h_T(\mathbf{U}')},$$

$h_T(\mathbf{V}) - h_T(\mathbf{U}') = q$, and $h_T(\mathbf{U}') = h_T(\mathbf{U})$. Hence, by the same argument as above, CUC applies and implies $\mathbf{V} \succ_T \mathbf{U}'$ (in fact, $\mathbf{V} \succ_T \mathbf{U}'$). Moreover,

$$g_T(\mathbf{U}') = g_T(\mathbf{V}) + p > g_T(\mathbf{V}) - r = g_T(\mathbf{U}).$$

Thus, by CD, $\mathbf{U}' \succ_T \mathbf{U}$ whence by transitivity $\mathbf{V} \succ_T \mathbf{U}$, a contradiction.

If $p > r$ and $q < s$ then $m^- > \frac{r}{q} > m^+$.

In this case, take $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z}, \mathbf{Y}', \mathbf{Z}', \mathbf{U}', \mathbf{V}' \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$ such that $\mathbf{Y} \in NW(\mathbf{Z})$, $\mathbf{Y}' \in NW(\mathbf{Z}')$, $\mathbf{Z} \succ_T \mathbf{Y}$, $\mathbf{Y}' \succ_T \mathbf{Z}'$

$$\begin{aligned} m^+ &= \frac{r}{s} = \frac{g_T(\mathbf{Y}') - g_T(\mathbf{Z}')}{h_T(\mathbf{Z}') - h_T(\mathbf{Y}')} = \frac{g_T(\mathbf{U}) - g_T(\mathbf{V}')}{h_T(\mathbf{V}') - h_T(\mathbf{U})} < \frac{g_T(\mathbf{U}) - g_T(\mathbf{V})}{h_T(\mathbf{V}) - h_T(\mathbf{U})} = \\ &= \frac{r}{q} < \frac{g_T(\mathbf{Y}) - g_T(\mathbf{Z})}{h_T(\mathbf{Z}) - h_T(\mathbf{Y})} = \frac{g_T(\mathbf{U}') - g_T(\mathbf{V})}{h_T(\mathbf{V}) - h_T(\mathbf{U}')} = \frac{p}{q} = m^-, \end{aligned}$$

$h_T(\mathbf{V}) - h_T(\mathbf{U}') = q$, $h_T(\mathbf{U}') = h_T(\mathbf{U})$, $g_T(\mathbf{U}) - g_T(\mathbf{V}') = r$, and $g_T(\mathbf{V}') = g_T(\mathbf{V})$. Then, by repeating the previous arguments, we have $\mathbf{V} \succ_T \mathbf{U}'$ and $\mathbf{U} \succ_T \mathbf{V}'$ by CUC; moreover, $g_T(\mathbf{U}') - g_T(\mathbf{V}) = p$, whence $g_T(\mathbf{U}') = g_T(\mathbf{V}) + p = (g_T(\mathbf{U}) - r) + p > g_T(\mathbf{U})$, hence, by CD, $\mathbf{U}' \succ_T \mathbf{U}$, and thus $\mathbf{V} \succ_T \mathbf{U}$ by transitivity. On the other hand, $h_T(\mathbf{V}') - h_T(\mathbf{U}) = s$, hence $h_T(\mathbf{V}') = h_T(\mathbf{U}) + s = (h_T(\mathbf{V}) - q) + s > h_T(\mathbf{V})$: thus, by CD, $\mathbf{V}' \succ_T \mathbf{V}$, hence, by transitivity, $\mathbf{U} \succ_T \mathbf{V}$, a contradiction again.

ii) $p > r, q > s$. Take $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z}, \mathbf{Z}' \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, such that $\mathbf{Y} \in NW(\mathbf{Z})$, $\mathbf{Y} \in NW(\mathbf{Z}')$,

$$\frac{g_T(\mathbf{Y}) - g_T(\mathbf{Z})}{h_T(\mathbf{Z}) - h_T(\mathbf{Y})} = \frac{p}{q} = m^-, \quad \frac{g_T(\mathbf{Y}) - g_T(\mathbf{Z}')}{h_T(\mathbf{Z}') - h_T(\mathbf{Y})} = \frac{r}{s} = m^+.$$

By definition of m^- and m^+ , and CUC, $\mathbf{Z} \succ_T \mathbf{Y}$ and $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}'$, hence by transitivity $\mathbf{Z} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}'$. Notice that

$$h_T(\mathbf{Z}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z}') = h_T(\mathbf{Z}) - h_T(\mathbf{Y}) + h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z}') = q - s > 0, \text{ and}$$

$$g_T(\mathbf{Z}') - g_T(\mathbf{Z}) = g_T(\mathbf{Z}') - g_T(\mathbf{Y}) + g_T(\mathbf{Y}) - g_T(\mathbf{Z}) = -r + p > 0,$$

hence $\mathbf{Z}' \in NW(\mathbf{Z})$. Now, observe that

$$\frac{p-r}{q-s} = \frac{p}{q} \cdot \left(\frac{q}{p} \cdot \frac{p-r}{q-s} \right) = \frac{p}{q} \cdot \left(\frac{q \cdot p - q \cdot r}{q \cdot p - p \cdot s} \right).$$

Since, by definition, $p \cdot s > q \cdot r$, it follows that $\left(\frac{q \cdot p - q \cdot r}{q \cdot p - p \cdot s} \right) > 1$, hence $\frac{p-r}{q-s} > \frac{p}{q}$. But then, $\frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}') - g_T(\mathbf{Z})}{h_T(\mathbf{Z}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z}')} = \frac{p-r}{q-s} > \frac{p}{q} = m^-$. Thus, since $\mathbf{Z}' \in NW(\mathbf{Z})$, it follows, by definition of m^- , that *not* $\mathbf{Z} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}'$, a contradiction.

iii) $p < r, q < s$. Take $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z}, \mathbf{Z}' \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, such that $\mathbf{Y} \in NW(\mathbf{Z}), \mathbf{Z}' \in NW(\mathbf{Z})$,

$$\frac{g_T(\mathbf{Y}) - g_T(\mathbf{Z})}{h_T(\mathbf{Z}) - h_T(\mathbf{Y})} = \frac{r}{s} = m^+, \frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}') - g_T(\mathbf{Z})}{h_T(\mathbf{Z}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z}')} = \frac{p}{q} = m^-.$$

Then, by CUC and the definition of m^+ and m^- , $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$ and $\mathbf{Z} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}'$, hence by transitivity $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}'$.

On the other hand, $\frac{g_T(\mathbf{Y}) - g_T(\mathbf{Z}')}{h_T(\mathbf{Z}') - h_T(\mathbf{Y})} = \frac{r-p}{s-q} > 0$, i.e. $\mathbf{Y} \in NW(\mathbf{Z}')$, and $\frac{r-p}{s-q} = \frac{r}{s} \cdot \left(\frac{s}{r} \cdot \frac{r-p}{s-q}\right) = \frac{r}{s} \cdot \left(\frac{r \cdot s - p \cdot s}{r \cdot s - r \cdot q}\right)$. Now, since $\frac{p}{q} > \frac{r}{s}$, $p \cdot s > r \cdot q$, whence $\left(\frac{r \cdot s - p \cdot s}{r \cdot s - r \cdot q}\right) < 1$. Thus, $\frac{r-p}{s-q} < \frac{r}{s} = m^+$ hence by definition of m^+ , $\text{not } \mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}'$, a contradiction again.

Summing up the results obtained under cases i) - iii) above we may conclude that $m^- > m^+$ is also impossible.

Therefore, since we have already shown that $m^- \neq m^+$, it follows that $m^- < m^+$.

Now, take any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, such that $\mathbf{Z} \in NW(\mathbf{Y})$, and $\frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})} \leq m^-$. Then, $\frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})} < m^+$, whence, by definition, $\text{not } \mathbf{Z} \succ_T \mathbf{Y}$. On the other hand, $(h_T(\mathbf{Y}), g_T(\mathbf{Y})) \neq (h_T(\mathbf{Z}), g_T(\mathbf{Z}))$, hence, by assumption, $\mathbf{Y} \approx_T \mathbf{Z}$. Since \succ_T is a total preorder, it follows that $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$. Similarly, take any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, such that $\mathbf{Z} \in NW(\mathbf{Y})$, and $m^+ \leq \frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})}$. Then, $\frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})} > m^-$, whence, by definition, $\text{not } \mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$. On the other hand, $(h_T(\mathbf{Y}), g_T(\mathbf{Y})) \neq (h_T(\mathbf{Z}), g_T(\mathbf{Z}))$, hence, by assumption, $\mathbf{Y} \approx_T \mathbf{Z}$. Since \succ_T is a total preorder, it follows that $\mathbf{Z} \succ_T \mathbf{Y}$, a contradiction. Therefore, for any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$, it cannot be the case that $m^- < \frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})} < m^+$.

But then, take any $w_1, w_2 \in \mathbb{R}_+ \setminus \{0\}$ such that $m^- < \frac{w_1}{w_2} < m^+$. By our previous observations, for any $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{P}[X]^N$ (so in particular for any such \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z} with $\mathbf{Y} \in NW(\mathbf{Z})$) either $\frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})} \leq m^-$ or $m^+ \leq \frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})}$. If $\frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})} \leq m^-$, then, as shown above, $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$. Moreover, $\frac{w_2}{w_1} \cdot \frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})} < (m^-)^{-1} \cdot m^- = 1$, i.e. $w_2 \cdot (g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})) < w_1 \cdot (h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z}))$, whence, by definition, $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^w \mathbf{Z}$ (with $w = (w_1, w_2)$). Conversely, let $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T \mathbf{Z}$. Similarly, if $m^+ \leq \frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})}$, then, as shown above, $\mathbf{Z} \succ_T \mathbf{Y}$ and $\frac{w_2}{w_1} \cdot \frac{g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})}{h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z})} > (m^+)^{-1} \cdot m^+ = 1$, i.e. $w_2 \cdot (g_T(\mathbf{Z}) - g_T(\mathbf{Y})) > w_1 \cdot (h_T(\mathbf{Y}) - h_T(\mathbf{Z}))$, whence, by definition, $\mathbf{Z} \succ_T^w \mathbf{Y}$ (with $w = (w_1, w_2)$), and the thesis follows.

(B) As the previous ones, the foregoing characterization of \succ_T^w is tight, as shown by the following examples:

i) Choose a pair $w = (w_1, w_2)$ of real positive weights, and take the following poverty ranking: $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^{w(1)} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^w \mathbf{Z}$ or $(\mathbf{Y} \sim_T^w \mathbf{Z}, \{Y_1, \dots, Y_n, Z_1, \dots, Z_n\} \not\subseteq \{T, \emptyset\} \text{ and } \#(Y_1 \cap T) \leq \#(Z_1 \cap T))$. That ranking is a total preorder that satisfies IIO, Q-IBED, CD, NC and CUC but fails to satisfy AN.

ii) Choose a pair $w = (w_1, w_2)$ of real positive weights, and consider the following refinement of the corresponding w -weighted poverty ranking: $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^{w(2)} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^w \mathbf{Z}$ or $(\mathbf{Y} \sim_T^w \mathbf{Z} \text{ and } \sum_{i \in N} \#(Y_i \setminus T) \geq \sum_{i \in N} \#(Z_i \setminus T))$. That ranking is a total preorder that satisfies AN, DEP, Q-IBED, CD and CUC but fails to satisfy IIO.

iii) Consider again the following poverty ranking: $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^{hg3} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $\sum_{i \in N, Y_i \not\supseteq T} \#(Y_i \cap T) \leq \sum_{i \in N, Z_i \not\supseteq T} \#(Z_i \cap T)$. That ranking is a total preorder that satisfies AN, IIO, Q-IBED, CD and CUC but fails to satisfy DEP.

iv) Choose $x^* \in T$ and a pair $w = (w_1, w_2)$ of real positive weights, and consider the following refinement of the corresponding w - weighted poverty ranking: $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^{w4} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^w \mathbf{Z}$ or $(\mathbf{Y} \sim_T^w \mathbf{Z}$ and either $[x^* \in (Y_{i^*} \cap Z_{j^*})]$ or $[x^* \notin Y_{i^*}]$, where $i^* = \min \{i \in N : Y_i \not\supseteq T\}$ and $j^* = \min \{i \in N : Z_i \not\supseteq T\}$). That ranking is a total preorder that satisfies AN, IIO, DEP, CD and CUC but fails to satisfy Q-IBED.

v) Choose a pair $w = (w_1, w_2)$ of real positive weights, and consider again the following poverty ranking: $\mathbf{Y} \succ_T^{gh5} \mathbf{Z}$ if and only if either $[\{Y_i, Z_i\} \subseteq \{T, \emptyset\}$ for each $i \in N$] or [there exists $i \in N$ such that $Z_i \notin \{T, \emptyset\}$]. It can be shown that \succ_T^{gh5} is indeed a total preorder: moreover, it satisfies AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED and CUC, but not CD.

vi) Consider \succ_T^{hg} (or \succ_T^{gh}): clearly both of them are poverty rankings, total preorders, and do satisfy AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED and CD, while violating CUC. \square

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